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N.J.R.E. 608 and Specific Instances of Conduct: The Time Has Come for New Jersey to Join the
Majority
Jenn Montan*
I. Introduction
Every trial, whether criminal or civil, requires the factfinder, whether judge or jury, to
carefully weigh the competing evidence and determine the disputed issues between the parties. As
such, the right of the parties to impeach the credibility of the witnesses is fundamental to the truthseeking process in all litigation. The right to impeach is considered such an important right that
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 607 expressly authorizes witness impeachment and provides that
“[a]ny party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”1
There are various, well-recognized grounds for impeaching the credibility of a witness.
For example, a party may show that a witness is biased in favor of or against a particular party,
that the witness lacks competency because of a mental or sensory incapacity or a lack of personal
knowledge, or that the witness has made a prior statement which is inconsistent with the witness’s
testimony.2

Another recognized method for impeaching the credibility of a witness is to

demonstrate that the witness possesses a character trait for untruthfulness.3 An attack on a
witness’s character for truthfulness is designed to demonstrate that the witness is by disposition
untruthful and therefore not credible as a witness in any case.4 It is this impeachment attack that
raises difficult questions as to the proper method for proving a witness’s character for truthfulness

*
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FED. R. EVID. 607 (emphasis added). New Jersey Rule of Evidence (N.J.R.E.) 607 similarly authorizes and extends
the right to impeach to the party calling the witness. See N.J.R.E. 607 (“Except as otherwise provided by Rules 405
and 608, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling
the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
2
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1
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and the extent to which untruthful character evidence may be shown through cross-examination or
through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Specifically, the question arises whether, and in what manner, a witness may be impeached
with specific instances of non-conviction misconduct that are probative of the witness’s character
for truthfulness. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in State v. Scott, a
case which squarely presented the division between FRE 608 and N.J.R.E. 608 and triggered two
divergent concurring opinions as to the proper course for New Jersey law going forward.5
With respect to impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness, both FRE 608(a)
and N.J.R.E. 608(a) expressly provide that a party may attack or support a witness’s character for
truthfulness through the introduction of character witnesses who may testify in the form of
reputation or opinion as to the witness’s character for truthfulness.6 In addition, FRE 608(b) and
N.J.R.E. 608(a) both prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of
conduct in order to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness.7
FRE 608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) diverge, however, on whether inquiry on crossexamination may be permitted as to specific instances of conduct that are probative of the witness’s
character for truthfulness. FRE 608(b) expressly provides that the court may allow such inquiry
on cross-examination,8 whereas N.J.R.E. 608(a) prohibits such inquiry.9 N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides
that “a trait of character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct”10 and the New Jersey
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State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 488 (2017).
FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about
that character . . . .”); N.J.R.E. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the witness’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness . . .”).
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courts interpret this provision to prohibit not only the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific
instances of conduct, but also inquiry as to such conduct on cross-examination.11 FRE 608(b)
provides in pertinent part:
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or
support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: (1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose
character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.12
N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the
witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and provided further that
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
Except as otherwise provided by Rule 609 and by paragraph (b) of this rule, a trait
of character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct.13
New Jersey’s formulation falls in the minority approach with respect to the use of specific
instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness. 14 Only three other states
have complete ban on the use of specific instances of conduct.15 This departure from FRE 608(b)
became the focal point of debate between Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin in State v. Scott.
In State v. Scott, the defendant, Thomas Scott, was charged with possession of heroin.16 At
trial, he argued that he did not knowingly possess the heroin because someone else placed it in his
jeans pocket before he put them on.17 Defendant sought to call his mother, Darlene Barbella, to

State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 488 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (“N.J.R.E. 608, however, bars not only the use
of extrinsic evidence but also cross-examination into specific instances of misconduct.”).
12
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
13
N.J.R.E. 608(a) (emphasis added).
14
Scott, 229 N.J. at 491 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
15
See MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608(b); OR. R. REV. Rule 608; TEX. R. EVID. 608(b).
16
Scott, 229 N.J. at 473.
17
Id.
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testify in support of this contention.18 Barbella was going to testify that she found the heroin in
defendant’s apartment lying on a table next to defendant’s cousin and known drug user, Jordan
Scott, and placed the heroin in the pocket of a pair of jeans she believed belonged to Jordan.19 To
impeach her, the State sought to introduce evidence of two prior occasions on which Barbella
allegedly lied to police to exonerate her son, the defendant.20 The trial court ruled the State’s
evidence admissible.21 As a result, the defendant chose not to call Barbella and instead called
Lauren Halbersberg, defendant’s friend, to testify to the same events.22
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the evidence would have been
admissible at trial.23 In holding that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the proposed
impeachment testimony was admissible, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the State’s
argument that Rule 608 provided grounds for admissibility.24 The court noted that “Rule 608
explicitly excludes specific instances of conduct as a means of proving character for
untruthfulness, permitting only opinion or reputation evidence.”25
This finding by the court regarding the application of N.J.R.E. 608 prompted concurring
opinions from Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin debating whether New Jersey’s bar on the
use of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness is still a
proper approach.26 Chief Justice Rabner argued that the outcome of the case highlights the
problems posed by the current rule.27 As a result, the Chief Justice proposed that it is time to

18

Id. at 474.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Scott, 229 N.J. at 474.
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Id. at 477.
24
Id. at 483.
25
Id.
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Id. at 486 (Rabner, C.J., concurring); Id. 494–95 (Albin, J., concurring).
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Id. at 492 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
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consider whether N.J.R.E. 608 should be revised to fall in line with the majority of states and its
federal counter part, FRE 608.28 Chief Justice Rabner highlighted the disadvantages of New
Jersey’s rule and called upon the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence
to consider the question for “a simple reason: the topic relates directly to the jury’s search for the
truth, which a system of justice should foster.”29
In response, Justice Albin argued that no justification for altering the current version
exists.30 Justice Albin explained that the current Rule is in line with the historic development of
New Jersey’s common law, which has always barred such evidence because its probative value is
outweighed by the potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a case.31 Justice
Albin posited that while New Jersey’s rules may not be perfect, they “accommodate two important
goals: the search for truth and the need for fairness in [the] criminal and civil justice system.”32
State v. Scott highlighted some of the problems and dangers N.J.R.E. 608 has created and
has presented the opportunity to assess New Jersey’s approach and determine whether change is
needed. This Comment will examine the arguments set forth in the concurring opinions in State
v. Scott and consider whether New Jersey should amend N.J.R.E. 608(a) and adopt the majority
approach and allow, on cross-examination, the use of specific instances of conduct that are
probative of the witness’s character for untruthfulness. Part II will review New Jersey’s approach
by examining the history and development of N.J.R.E. 608 from common law to its current
formulation and review how the rule is applied with regard to specific instances of conduct. Part
III will examine the majority approach with a focus on the formulation and application of the

28

Scott, 229 N.J. at 494.
Id.
30
Id. at 496 (Albin, J., concurring).
31
Id. at 495.
32
Id. at 496.
29
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federal analogue to N.J.R.E. 608, FRE 608. Part IV will assess the potential dangers of allowing
specific instances of conduct and examine the arguments and counter arguments regarding how
the majority approach addresses these issues. Part V will examine New Jersey’s options to address
this issue and make changes to the current rule. Overall, this Comment will argue that New
Jersey’s current formulation of Rule 608 does not adequately address the use of specific instances
of conduct. While apprehension for allowing the use of specific instances of conduct is valid, a
complete bar raises equally valid concerns; adoption of a rule that takes a restrictive approach will
provide an adequate compromise that properly addresses the issues raised on both sides.
II. Development of N.J.R.E. 608
New Jersey is one of four states that have a complete bar on the use of specific instances
of conduct to prove a character trait.33 This approach embodies the New Jersey common-law rule.
Early cases made clear that an attempt to impeach the character of a witness is limited to the
witness’s reputation in the community for truth and veracity.34 For example, in an early case from
1883 the rule was set out by the court in Paul v. Paul.35 The court held that unless character is the
central issue, such as rape, or breach of promise, “proof that a witness was a common prostitute,

33

See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
See King v. Ruckman, 20 N.J. Eq. 316, 357 (Ch. 1869) (“But the greatest portion of the testimony is such as
cannot be regarded. It is evidently founded upon the fact that Ruckman has been guilty of very improper conduct
with regard to the cattle of his neighbors, [and] is a troublesome, litigious man . . . . Such witnesses are necessarily
produced when they alone know or witnessed facts required to be proved; but when selected to give character to a
witness, are not of much value. The only testimony allowed in such case is as to the general reputation of the
witness impeached, in the neighborhood, for truth and veracity . . . .”), rev’d, 21 N.J. Eq. 599 (1870); see also
Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq. 150, 157 (Ch. 1869) (“[P]articular transactions . . . [are] not evidence which the law
permits, or should permit, to affect the credibility of a witness. . . . The object of the law is to show the character of
the witness as to telling the truth; general reputation in the community where he is known, is the test and the only
test which the law allows as to character.”); State v. Hendrick, 70 N.J.L. 41, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (“A witness may be
discredited by evidence attacking his character for truth and veracity but not by the proof of particular independent
facts, though bearing upon the question of veracity.”).
35
37 N.J. Eq. 23 (Ch. 1883).
34
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offered to impeach her testimony, is incompetent.”36 The court cited La Beau v. People, for the
general rule that
inquiries as to particular acts of immorality [are] inadmissible . . . it would be
impossible for the witness to be prepared for a defense of particular acts, and it
would lead to an indefinite number of issues. Therefore, on an issue upon the
character of a witness, it cannot be allowed to inquire into particular facts.37
Early on, New Jersey recognized the potential dangers of allowing inquiries into specific instances
of conduct to prove a character trait and as a result followed this general rule that barred use of
such evidence.
In State v. De Paola, decided in 1950, the Supreme Court of New Jersey continued with
the application of this common-law rule.38 The defendant was convicted of murder.39 At trial, the
defendant took the stand and on cross-examination was asked about prior liquor-license
applications in which the defendant allegedly provided a false answer to a question on the
application while under oath.40 The prosecution aimed to use the specific instances of conduct to
show that if the defendant had lied on multiple applications, then he was lying now and his
testimony could not be trusted.41 The defendant was compelled to answer the question and
admitted that each year from 1941 to 1948, he had lied on the liquor-license applications.42 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing this line of questioning on crossexamination.43 The State argued that the matter was within the discretion of the trial court and the
testimony objected to was permissible to show lack of veracity on the part of the defendant.44 The
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Id. at 26.
33 How. Pr. 66, 72 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1865).
38
5 N.J. 1 (1950).
39
Id. at 7.
40
Id. at 9.
41
Id. at 10
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
De Paola, 5 N.J. at 10.
37
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court found little merit to the State’s theory, noting that there was no authority cited in support of
its contention.45
The court examined New Jersey case law regarding the approach to this issue and found
that New Jersey had adopted a “rule which excludes the proof of independent facts to discredit a
witness.”46 The court noted that the acts referred to were not connected to the charge upon which
the defendant was being tried and were unrelated to the central issues of the case.47 Moreover, the
defendant had not been convicted for perjury or false swearing by reason of his misconduct in this
respect.48 In light of these findings, the court held that the admission of the testimony was
reversible error.49
De Paola and the early New Jersey cases illustrate the rule regarding inquiry into specific
instances of conduct that New Jersey had developed. Prior bad acts that did not result in a
conviction that were probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness could not be inquired
into on cross-examination. Some of the underlying rationales were that such testimony was
collateral to the main issues of the case and it would be unreasonable to expect that a defendantwitness could be prepared to defend against possible questioning into any area of his life.50
New Jersey formally codified the prohibition on specific instances of conduct in 1967
under N.J. EVID. R. 22(d), which provided, “as affecting the credibility of a witness . . . evidence
of specific instances of his conduct, relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall

45

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12 (quoting State v. Hendrick, 70 N.J.L. 41, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1903)).
47
Id. at 13.
48
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 13.
50
See also Ippolito v. Turp, 126 N.J.L. 403, 407 (1940) (“Every man is supposed to be capable of supporting his
general reputation whenever it is attacked but not to meet specific transactions not an issue in the cause.”).
46
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be inadmissible.”51 When N.J. EVID. R. 22 was prepared it was “representative of current New
Jersey [common] law.”52
In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Committee on the Rules of
Evidence to survey the feasibility of amending the New Jersey evidence rules. 53 The Committee
was to consider whether or to what extent New Jersey should adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which were enacted in 1975 and by that time were followed by many states.54 In 1991, the
Committee recommended a sweeping change in the New Jersey evidence scheme and the new
rules went into effect in 1993.55 The revised rules constituted an amalgamation of the federal and
then-current New Jersey evidence rules, following federal numeration and arrangement.56
New N.J.R.E. 608 incorporated the limiting principles of N.J. EVID. R. 22(d) with respect
to admission of evidence of a trait of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness when offered
under N.J. EVID. R. 20 to affect the credibility of a witness.57 The Committee noted that N.J.R.E.
608 follows the formulation of FRE 608; however, the Committee rejected the provision in
paragraph (b) of the federal rule that allowed for the use of specific instances of conduct on crossexamination.58 The Committee believed that this rejection “retains present New Jersey practice”
noting that “N.J. EVID. R. 22(d), followed by this rule, prohibited ‘specific instances of conduct’
proof in any form if introduced to prove a trait of character.”59 Moreover, the Committee believed

51

N.J. EVID. R. 22 (effective 1967).
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, March 1963 (1963) (citing State v. De Paola, 5
N.J. 1 (1950)).
53
Alma G. Lopez, New Jersey’s Other-Crimes Rules and the Evidence Committee’s Abrogation of Almost Two
Hundred Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 394, 423 (1993).
54
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J.L.J. 1 (Oct. 10, 1991).
55
Lopez, supra note 53, at 425–26 (citing Stephen W. Townsend, Esq., Notices to the Bar: Supreme Court of New
Jersey Revisions to the Rules of Evidence, 134 N.J.L.J. 798, 798 (July 5, 1993)).
56
Lopez, supra note 49, at 423.
57
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J.L.J. 1, 25 (Oct. 10, 1991).
58
Id.
59
Id.
52
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that N.J.R.E. 607 already “affords sufficient scope for the effective impeachment of credibility.”60
Thus, New Jersey maintained its approach to specific instances of conduct in rejecting the federal
formulation.
In 2004, a case came before the New Jersey Supreme Court that forced the court to consider
whether the general prohibition on specific conduct evidence could be subject to an exception in a
particular context.61 In State v. Guenther, the court had to decide whether the credibility of a
witness who has accused a defendant of sexual abuse may be impeached by evidence that the
witness had made a prior false criminal accusation.62 The defendant, Kenneth Guenther, was
accused by his stepdaughter, D.F., of sexually abusing her over the course of five years.63 During
trial, defendant received documents revealing that D.F. admitted to falsely accusing her neighbor
of sexually abusing her.64 The defense requested permission to cross-examine D.F. regarding this
prior false accusation and in the event that she denied making the false accusation, the defendant
stated his intent to impeach D.F. with extrinsic evidence.65 The trial court denied this request and
ruled that “the purported false accusation was ‘irrelevant’ and ‘extremely collateral’ and, therefore,
inappropriate for consideration by the jury.”66 The defendant was convicted of sexual assault.67
On appeal from the trial court, the Appellate Division remanded for the determination of
whether D.F. made the false accusation and if so whether it was false.68 The court directed that if
it is found that the accusation was made but determined that the evidence was inadmissible, the

60

Id.
State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 132 (2004).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 134.
64
Id. at 132.
65
Id. at 133.
66
Id. at 134.
67
Guenther, 181 N.J. at 138.
68
Id.
61
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verdict would stand.69 If the court found, however, that D.F. made the false accusation and that it
was admissible, a new trial would be necessary.70 The State petitioned for certification arguing
that the decision was contrary to N.J.R.E. 608 and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
certification to address the issue.71
The court had to determine whether the common-law principle embodied in N.J.R.E. 608
had continuing vitality when applied to evidence of a victim-witness’s prior false accusation.72
The court traced the development of the rule noting that it was “not a lack of relevance that gave
rise to the rule” prohibiting the use of specific instances of conduct to attack the witness’s character
for truthfulness, but “the ‘auxiliary policies’ regarding unfairness to the witness, confusion of
issues, and undue consumption of time.”73 Thus, according to the court, these auxiliary policies
illustrate that the bar on the use of specific instances of conduct to prove a character trait was
adopted “for pragmatic reasons associated with the efficient and orderly presentation of a trial.”74
These reasons remain the present justification for the rule today.75 The court explained, however,
that when these “auxiliary policies” do not apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence
no longer exists.76
With these principles in mind, the court then addressed whether limited circumstances
warrant an exception to N.J.R.E. 608.77 The court noted that various jurisdictions across the
country have addressed this issue and in sexual crime cases have permitted cross-examination of
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Id.
Id.
71
Id. at 138–39.
72
Id. at 141.
73
Guenther, 181 N.J. at 142 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 979, at 827 (Chadbourn rev.1970)).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 141.
76
Id. at 142.
77
Id. at 147.
70
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a witness-accuser who has falsely alleged a sexual crime on a previous occasion.78 In light of this,
the court concluded that in a criminal case involving impeachment of a victim-witness whose
credibility was the central issue in the case, a defendant has the right to show that a victim-witness
has made a prior false criminal accusation for the purpose of challenging that witness’s
credibility.79
The court outlined the proper procedure for determining whether the evidence should be
admitted as well as the relevant factors to consider, stressing that courts must ensure that
“testimony on the subject does not become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes
charged.”80 The court emphasized that its ruling was not creating a new rule of evidence but
carving out a narrow exception to N.J.R.E. 608 to allow for the introduction of relevant evidence
that may affect jurors’ estimation of the credibility of a key witness.81 Thus, the court concluded,
this limited exception will enhance the “fairness and truth-seeking function of a trial,”82 and is
consistent with the rationale underpinning the rule.83 Guenther illustrates New Jersey’s current
formulation of the rule with the now-added exception. Moreover, Guenther summarized the
continuing rationale for maintaining the bar on specific instances of conduct but also outlined the
circumstances that would render the rule and its underlying policies no longer necessary.

78

Id. at 151–54.
Guenther, 181 N.J. at 154, 156 (noting that the holding is limited to “criminal case[s] that involve[] the
impeachment of a victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case”). The exception recognized by
the court here is reflected in N.J.R.E. 608(b):
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior
false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the
judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the
prior false accusation.
80
Guenther, 181 N.J. at 157.
81
Id. at 159.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 154.
79

12

III. Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through
Specific Instances of Conduct
This Part turns to the majority approach regarding specific conduct evidence in the context
of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness and how the rule is applied. FRE 608(b) is
representative of the majority approach. A majority of states follow the federal approach and
permit cross-examination into specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the witness’s
character for truthfulness.84
FRE 608 envisions three ways of showing that a witness is by character or disposition
either truthful or untruthful: (1) by testimony as to reputation; 85 (2) by testimony in the form of
opinion;86 and (3) by evidence of specific instances of conduct.87 With respect to specific instances
of conduct, FRE 608(b) uses the verb “may” in this setting, making it clear that the matter is left

84

Ten states use the language from the current version of FRE 608(b) as amended in 2011. See ARIZ. R.
EVID. 608(b); IOWA R. EVID. 608(b); ME. R. EVID. 608(b); MISS. R. EVID. 608(b); N.H. R. EVID. 608(b); N.M. R.
EVID. 11–608(B); N.D. R. EVID. 608(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19–19–608(b) (2016); UTAH R. EVID. 608(b); W.
VA. R. EVID. 608(b). Six states use the language from the version of FRE 608(b) as amended in 2003. See COLO. R.
EVID. 608(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b) (2013); MINN. R. EVID. 608(b); OHIO R. EVID. 608(B); TENN. R.
EVID. 608(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.08(2) (2018). Sixteen states use the language from the original 1975 version.
See ARK. R. EVID. 608(b); DEL. R. EVID. 608(b); IDAHO R. EVID. 608(b); KY. R. EVID. 608(b); MICH. R.
EVID. 608(b); MT. R. REV. Rule 608(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608(2) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085(3) (1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2608(B) (1978); R.I. R. EVID. 608(b); S.C. R.
EVID. 608(b); VT. R. EVID. 608(b); WASH. R. EVID. 608(b); WYO. R. EVID. 608(b). Six states adopted only the latter
part of the rule, FRE 608(b)(2); they permit cross-examination of a character witness with specific instances of
conduct about the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the underlying witness. See ALA. R.
EVID. 608(b); ALASKA R. EVID. 608(b); IND. R. EVID. 608(b); LA. CODE EVID. ART. 608(B); PA. R.
EVID. 608(b); VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:608. Connecticut also follows the federal approach. CONN. CODE EVID. 6–6(b).
Maryland also allows cross-examination about a witness’s prior conduct that is probative of untruthfulness, when
the questioner, if challenged, “establishes a reasonable factual basis” outside the jury’s presence. MD. R. 5-608(b).
Hawaii permits cross-examination about specific instances of a witness’s conduct, if probative of
untruthfulness, and affords judges discretion to allow the use of extrinsic evidence. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-608(b)
(1993). Kansas allows any party to “introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by [the witness] and any
other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (1963). California permits
evidence of specific instances of conduct to challenge a witness’s credibility in criminal but not civil cases. See
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; CAL. EVID. CODE § 787; People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 640–41 (Cal. 1989).
85
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
86
Id.
87
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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to the discretion of the court.88 This raises two questions: (a) what general considerations govern
a court’s exercise of discretion under subdivision; and (b) when is specific-instances evidence
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness?89
A. What Governs the Court’s Exercise of Discretion?
While the current text of subdivision (b) provides no guidance, an early version of that
provision stated that FRE 403 and FRE 611 supply the governing principles.90 Drafters eventually
removed from the text this reference to FRE 403 and FRE 611; however, as indicated in the
Advisory Committee notes, the revision did not render those rules irrelevant to the
analysis.91 Accordingly, the courts recognize that FRE 403 and FRE 611 identify the principles
controlling the exercise of discretion under FRE 608(b).92 Under those rules, the court’s job is to
balance the probative value of specific-instances evidence against the potential dangers and costs
of that evidence.93
Some of the general factors courts consider in this analysis are: (1) whether the witness’s
testimony is crucial or unimportant, (2) the relevancy of the act of misconduct to truthfulness, (3)
the nearness or remoteness of the misconduct to the time of trial, (4) whether the matter inquired
into is likely to lead to time-consuming, distracting explanations on cross-examination or re-

Id. (“But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .”) (emphasis added).
89
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6118.
90
Id. § 6111.
91
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes (“[T]he overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative
value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule
611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment.”).
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See United States v. Seymour, 472 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 608(b) is explicit that the determination of
whether to allow specific instances of conduct to be used to challenge a witness’s reputation for truthfulness is
committed to the discretion of the district judge, and Rule 403 establishes the standard for the exercise of the judge’s
discretion in evidentiary matters . . . .”).
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WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6118; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[T]he court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding probative value of evidence
concerning character for veracity must outweigh danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading jury).
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examination, and (5) whether there will be unfair humiliation of the witness and undue prejudice
to the party which called the witness.94 It is further recognized that courts have broad discretion
in making this determination and a trial judge’s ruling can be overturned only on a finding of abuse
of discretion.95
For example, in United States v. Bunchan, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial
court abused its discretion in limiting inquiry into specific instances of conduct on crossexamination.96 The defendant sought to cross-examine a government witness about criminal
charges that were currently pending against him for indecent assault and battery of a child.97 The
defendant argued that the inquiry was permissible under FRE 608(b) as a specific instance of prior
conduct relevant to the witness’s character for truthfulness.98 The trial court permitted the
defendant to elicit, through cross-examination of the witness, that there were state court charges
currently pending against him.99 But the trial court ordered that he could not inquire into the nature
of the charges, finding such an inquiry “far too prejudicial under FRE 403.”100
The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s restriction of the
cross-examination of the witness.101 Citing FRE 403, the Court of Appeals noted that the ruling
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CHARLES T MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §41, at 93 (5th ed. 1999); see also United States v.
Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 719 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[P]roper factors to be employed in measuring the scope of crossexamination [are]: the importance of the testimony to the government’s case, the relevance of the conduct to the
witness’s truthfulness, and the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by evidence sought to be adduced.”);
Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the probative value of evidence
that one of the defendant’s agents embezzled $40,000 in connection with the plaintiff’s lease was greatly
outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice).
95
See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4-608 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02c (2017); see
also United States v. Ortiz, 5 F.3d 288, 290–91 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding no abuse of discretion in excluding, as
irrelevant, personnel file of government agent offered for impeachment and finding that Rule 608(b) expressly
provided that instances of conduct may be inquired into on cross-examination “in the discretion of the court” and
that the “district court has broad discretion in assessing admissibility of any evidence”).
96
580 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2009).
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allowed defendant to raise the possibility that the witness would receive lighter treatment on the
state charges if he testified favorably for the government.102 The Court of Appeals found, however,
that exposing the nature of the pending state charges was not necessary to present such evidence.103
Further, the Court of Appeals noted that FRE 608(b) only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the
conduct is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.104 The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that “the nature of the
sexual assault charges was not sufficiently probative of [the witness’s] character for truthfulness
to outweigh the serious danger of prejudicing the jury against him . . . .”105
Bunchan illustrates the role of FRE 403 in the determination of whether inquiry into
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination will be permitted. This approach allows judges
to balance the interests on both sides and take into account particular facts and circumstances of
the case before the court. Moreover, as in this case, it allows judges to admit the evidence where
it is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness but can limit the inquiry so as to preclude
any of the dangers listed in FRE 403.
B. What Conduct is Probative of Truthfulness?
FRE 608(b) provides that a court may allow specific instances of conduct “if they are
probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”106 The critical question, therefore,
is what kinds of conduct are probative of truthfulness. Courts have taken three basic approaches
to determining whether certain conduct is relevant to the witness’s character for truthfulness.107
Under a broad view, virtually any conduct indicating bad character relates to untruthfulness. 108
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Under the middle view, “behavior seeking personal advantage by taking from others in violation
of their rights” may be admissible if committed under circumstances reflecting on veracity. 109
Under the narrow view, conduct is admissible only if it directly involves falsehood or deception,
such as forgery or perjury.110
Under the broad view, the expansive scope of possible acts that indicate bad behavior opens
up the witness’s entire life to probing, leaving the witness vulnerable to embarrassment and
abuse.111 Moreover, the indirect inferences on which the veracity argument depends are too weak
to justify this approach.112 Recognizing these difficulties and potential for abuse, virtually no
modern decisions seem to take this view.113 Most courts tend to fall in either the middle view or
narrow view as they recognize the dangers the broad view presents and insist on closer links
between the conduct and veracity.114
In United States v. Manske, the Court of Appeals had to decide whether FRE
608(b) allowed cross-examination concerning a witness’s threats of violence which were intended
to influence the truthfulness of other witness’s testimony against him.115 The trial court did not
permit inquiry into the instances of conduct, holding that such evidence was irrelevant. 116 The
trial court noted that FRE 608(b) did not allow the use of the threat evidence to cross-examine the
witness because such evidence did not go to character for truthfulness, “but rather, to the character
for violence and [the witness’s] threatening nature.”117
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals began by discussing the three approaches in determining
whether this conduct was probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.118 The Court of Appeals
ultimately adopted the middle view.119 The court explained that under this view specific act
evidence is admissible when, although “the specific instance of conduct may not facially appear
relevant to truthfulness, closer inspection reveals that it bears on the issue.”120 The Court of
Appeals noted that this more flexible standard under the middle view is a wise approach. 121 This
standard allows questions that would not be embraced by the narrow view, which precludes
evidence that may not facially appear to be relevant to truthfulness.122
Applying this approach, the Court of Appeals found that FRE 608(b) did not limit inquiry
only to conduct involving fraud or deceit, but permits cross-examination into “acts that reflect
adversely on a person’s honesty and integrity.”123 Thus, the court held that “threatening to cause
physical harm to a person who proposes to testify against you is . . . probative of truthfulness.”124
The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court construed the threat evidence too narrowly by
perceiving the threats as probative only of violence.125 The violent conduct, however, was a proper
subject of inquiry on cross-examination because under the circumstances the threatening conduct
was aimed at concealing or distorting the truth, thus implicating the witness’s truthfulness.126
While these categories have been recognized, courts generally confine their analyses to the
specific conduct raised before them and assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the conduct is
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probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.127 For example, the Court of Appeals in United States
v. Leake considered whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit defense counsel to question
a witness on cross-examination concerning various fraudulent financial schemes.128 In interpreting
the scope of FRE 608 and more specifically, what matters can be raised on cross-examination, the
Court of Appeals found that FRE 608 “authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that
are ‘clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,’ such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery,
bribery, and embezzlement.”129
The Court of Appeals held that the conduct defense counsel sought to expose was probative
of the witness’s truthfulness.130 The witness’s conduct included obtaining money under false
pretenses, defrauding an innkeeper, various checks drawn by the witness that had been returned
for insufficient funds, numerous default judgments that had been entered against the witness in
civil actions seeking repayment of loans, and the witness, or firms that he controlled, had entered
numerous contracts to build churches, received payment, but failed to complete the work under
the contracts.131 The court concluded that such conduct “certainly establish[es] a pattern of
fraudulent activity that, if revealed, would have placed [the witness’s] credibility in question.”132
Further examples of particular conduct that many courts have concluded are probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness include conduct that consists of acts clearly implicating veracity
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such as insurance fraud,133 lying in court,134 tax fraud,135 using a false name or identity,136 lying
repeatedly,137 lying on credit card application,138 lying on a job application,139 lying on a license
application,140 bank fraud,141 and bribery.142 Conversely, courts have generally found that
conduct is not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness where the conduct consisted of marital
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See United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding cross-examination concerning
specific facts of insurance fraud).
134
See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Nothing could be more probative of a
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See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A witness’ use of false names or false
identities is a proper subject of cross-examination under [FRE] 608.”); United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d 469, 473 (9th
Cir. 1980) (affirming cross-examination about statements made in a letter in which the witness admitted to falsifying
his name, his occupation, and the name of his business).
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See United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that it was proper for the government to
cross-examine a witness regarding his false credit card applications to show a general lack of credibility).
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See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming inquiry on cross-examination
regarding false statements the witness made on two employment applications because the witness’s honesty or lack
thereof on the applications was “plainly probative of his character for truthfulness”).
140
See United States v. Carlin, 698 F.2d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1983) (permitting cross-examination of witness as to
the truthfulness of his answer on his verified application for used car dealer licenses).
141
See United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding cross-examination into alleged bank
fraud was proper because such conduct constitutes specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness).
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See United States v. Wilson, 985 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming cross-examination regarding prior acts
of bribery because bribery is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness).
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infidelity,143 prostitution,144 drug-related acts,145 domestic abuse,146 child abuse,147 violent
crimes,148 arson,149 murder,150 parole violations,151 manslaughter,152 and assault.153
Thus, whether conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness is largely left to the
discretion of the court. Though, courts tend to look toward conduct that clearly speaks to
veracity and if presented with conduct that is not on its face probative of veracity, will evaluate
the evidence in light of the circumstances to determine whether the conduct, upon closer
inspection, bears on the question of veracity.154
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credibility).
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murder as they do not tell anything of the witness’s tendency to be truthful).
151
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C. Prohibition of Extrinsic Evidence
Although FRE 608(b) permits inquiry on cross-examination about specific instances of
conduct, the rule expressly prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove such conduct occurred
in order to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness. 155 Extrinsic evidence is
evidence offered through documents or other witnesses, rather than elicited from crossexamination of the witness himself or herself.156 For example, in United States v. Mangiameli, the
Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred in excluding portions of the proffered
testimony of a defense witness offered to impeach the veracity of a prosecution witness. 157 The
defense witness would have testified regarding specific instances of the untruthfulness under oath
by the prosecution witness.158
The Court of Appeals found that evidence of multiple instances of lying under oath was
calculated to prove the prosecution witness’s general character for veracity thus, subject to the
restrictions of FRE 608(b).159 The court further noted that the provisions of FRE 608(b) provide
that specific instances of a witness’s conduct, for the purpose of attacking his character for
truthfulness, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.160 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the defense may have inquired into the specific instances of conduct to attack the
prosecution witness’s character for truthfulness upon cross-examination of that witness.161 But,

FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The notion underlying
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by seeking to introduce the specific conduct evidence through the testimony of another witness,
the defense attempted to attack the prosecution witness’s character for truthfulness by extrinsic
evidence of conduct, “which is forbidden by Rule 608(b).”162 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
held that the evidence was properly excluded.163
Moreover, the prohibition on extrinsic evidence means that once counsel asks the witness
about the specific instance of conduct, counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer.” 164 And if the
witness denies the conduct, counsel may not introduce any further evidence, by way of calling
another witness or introducing physical evidence, to prove the witness committed the act. 165 In
this way FRE 608(b) gives meaning to the adage that the questioner must “take the answer of the
witness.”166 For example, in United States v. Goings, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
had discretion to exclude written evidence that a government witness failed to repay the entire
advance from her next paycheck.167 The Court of Appeals explained that FRE 608(b) allows crossexamination about specific instances of conduct that concern the witness’s character for
truthfulness, “but forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific bad act
occurred.”168 Therefore, after the witness specifically denied that she had ever failed to fully repay
a payroll advance from her next paycheck, “the defendants could not introduce extrinsic evidence
to contradict her.”169
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IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s
Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct
A. Dangers in Allowing Inquiry into Specific Instances of Conduct
While character evidence may be relevant on the question whether a witness is testifying
truthfully, the use of such evidence may cause problems with judicial administration and
unfairness to the parties.170 In fact, it has been suggested that a complete bar on the use of
specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness may be the
preferable approach “given the dangers of prejudice (particularly if the witness is a party), of
distraction and confusion, of abuse by asking unfounded questions, and the difficulties of
determining whether particular acts relate to character for truthfulness.”171
In his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Justice Albin illustrated these problems and
noted that this form of impeachment has been prohibited because “the probative value of such
questioning is outweighed by the potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in
a case.”172 Moreover, Justice Albin explained that the threat of collateral attacks regarding
specific instances that are “wholly unrelated to the litigation” could keep crime victims from
coming forward and injury victims from bringing their claims.173 Such a threat might also deter
defendants from taking the stand, thus depriving the jury of their testimony.174 And finally,

170

See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36
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parties would be encouraged to forage for impeachment evidence to launch wide-ranging attacks
on a witness’s credibility.175
One of the general dangers presented by specific instances of conduct is the potential to
confuse or distract the jury from the substantive issues being tried.176 Evidence of specific acts is
usually not relevant to the issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for the
jury.177 In addition, whether a jury is able to limit its consideration of character evidence to the
character evidence’s effect on the witness’s credibility, even after instruction, is doubtful.178
More concerning is when the witness is a party, which makes the ramifications of this prejudicial
effect especially serious. In a criminal case, this exposes a testifying defendant to the danger that
the jury may believe that the defendant is a bad person deserving of punishment, regardless of
whether he or she committed the offense.179
Misconduct evidence also raises questions concerning the appropriate treatment of
witnesses. Such evidence creates potential for unfairness and embarrassment.180 Wigmore
suggested that imposing limits on misconduct evidence was compelled by common decency:
“[T]he ruthless flaying of personal character in the witness box is not only cowardly—because
there is no escape for the victim—and brutal—because it inflicts the pain of public exposure of
misdeeds to idle bystanders—but it has often not the slightest justification of necessity.”181
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Potential for unfair surprise to a witness is present because opposing counsel can forage through
a witness’s past and inquire into any conduct from the witness’s life that may bear on
truthfulness.182 This presents an unfair challenge as witnesses cannot be expected to defend
against every aspect of their lives, thus increasing the chances a witness “will be surprised by,
and unprepared to respond to, totally unfounded charges of misconduct.”183 Misconduct
evidence also may deter witnesses from coming forward for fear of being publicly humiliated
since witnesses may be subjected to an unrestrained public dissection of their character, thus
depriving “justice of the fullest opportunity to obtain useful testimony.”184
Finally, each of these dangers all have the underlying possibility of causing undue
delay.185 The potential for “mini-trials” and side-excursions into each witness’s past, which as
noted above are usually not relevant to the substantive issues of the case, create a real danger of
not only confusing the issues but prolonging the trial.186 There is also the possibility of a witness
who, even though is being impeached, does not dispute the alleged misconduct but “may want to
provide an explanation that diminishes its import or testify to other conduct that reveals the
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misconduct to be unrepresentative of her character.”187 Thus, further detracting from the main
issues and spending prolonged time on collateral matters wholly unrelated to the case.
B. Arguments for Using the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for
Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct
While the use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character presents
various dangers, conscious awareness of these concerns provided the basis for crafting FRE 608.188
Specific conduct evidence is not permitted wholesale and is subject to various limitations. In his
concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Chief Justice Rabner illustrated the benefits of the majority
approach noting that there are safeguards put in place that protect against these concerns. 189 In
addition, Chief Justice Rabner emphasized that New Jersey’s current formulation shields witnesses
from being questioned about specific conduct that bears directly on credibility and thus has the
effect of presenting witnesses to the jury “under an artificial light.” 190 Therefore, the majority
approach as represented by FRE 608 is crafted in a way to alleviate the dangers outlined in the
previous section and gives equal weight to the competing concern of impeding the search for the
truth.191
First, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence recognized the potential for abuse and
dangers, thus the rule was crafted to address the dangers of permitting specific conduct evidence.192
The Advisory Committee Notes to subdivision (b) provide, “[e]ffective cross-examination
demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of
abuse are substantial. Consequently, safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements .
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. . .”193

Those requirements include that the conduct be probative of truthfulness or

untruthfulness.194 Moreover, the overriding protection of FRE 403 requires that probative value
not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 195
FRE 611 further bars harassment and undue embarrassment.196 In addition, FRE 608(b) is
intended to be restrictive.197 In fact, the original rule was amended by Congress to ensure that it
would be restrictively interpreted by trial courts.198 The rule does not authorize inquiry on crossexamination into instances of conduct that do not actually indicate a lack of truthfulness.199
One of the major limitations contained in FRE 608(b) is the prohibition on the use of
extrinsic evidence.200 This limitation is designed to protect against undue delay as well as
confusion of the issues.201 As explained above, when a witness is questioned about prior
misconduct, counsel is “bound” by the witness’s answers and may not introduce extrinsic evidence
to prove the misconduct.202 Thus, counsel may not call another witness or bring in other evidence
to disprove a denial and show that the conduct occurred.203 It is recognized that absent the
limitation, this process may amount to a considerable time expenditure that could lead to time
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consuming “mini trials” on collateral issues.204 This concern illustrates the principal purpose of
this safeguard—to limit the time spent on issues that are not central to the case and to maintain the
focus of the trial on substantive issues and matters bearing directly on credibility. 205 In addition,
it reduces the risk of unfair prejudice that accompanies inquiry into behavior bearing on
untruthfulness since such behavior is likely to consist of some form of negative conduct and juries
are likely to misuse the evidence, especially if the witness is a party.206
In sum, as explained by Chief Justice Rabner, the bar against extrinsic evidence alleviates
the possible dangers from inquiry into specific instances of conduct for two reasons. First, “[t]here
is no danger of confusion of issues, because the matter stops with question and answer.”207 Second,
“[t]here is no danger of unfair surprise, because the impeached witness is not obliged to be ready
with other witnesses to answer the extrinsic testimony of the opponent, for there is none to be
answered . . . .”208 Thus, many of the major concerns that come with permitting inquiry into
specific instances of conduct are addressed and properly limited by the prohibition against extrinsic
evidence.
In addition, FRE 608(b) is also subject to FRE 403 and FRE 611 as further safeguards to
bar testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue prejudice or
harassment.209 As explained above, the text of the rule leaves to the judge’s discretion the
determination of whether or not to allow inquiry into specific instances of conduct. 210 The judge
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must consider whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Moreover, the
overriding requirements of FRE 403 require a judge to balance the issues and ensure that the
determination is guided by the understanding that such evidence can have a detrimental effect on
the parties and the policies and goals of the justice system.
United States v. Shinderman provides an illustration of the careful balancing process that
courts employ.211 In this case, the Court of Appeals had to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in permitting the government, on cross-examination, to question the defendant about
his responses to questions when applying for a medical license. 212 The defendant applied for a
medical license in 2001 and 2002.213 On each application, he answered “no” to a question asking
whether he had ever “been charged, summonsed, indicted, arrested or convicted of any criminal
offense . . . .”214 The government had evidence that defendant had been arrested twice for drugrelated offenses, although neither arrest culminated in a conviction.215
The government wanted to cross-examine defendant regarding the applications, seeking to
cast doubt upon his truthfulness.216 The defendant objected and moved to exclude any such
inquiry.217 He admitted that he had been arrested, but asserted that the arrests had been expunged
and therefore, he had answered the questions truthfully and on the advice of counsel.218 Defendant
offered an affidavit from his counsel to support this contention.219 The trial court concluded that
the affidavit “provided ‘no convincing ground’ to support the defendant’s belief that the arrests
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had vanished” and did not have to be disclosed on the applications.220 Then, in the exercise of its
discretion, the trial court ruled that the government could cross-examine defendant about his arrestrelated answers.221 The trial court precluded the government from introducing the arrest records
themselves into evidence.222
In assessing this ruling, the Court of Appeals noted that a judge’s discretion in determining
the scope of cross-examination is subject to the “overarching need to balance probative worth
against prejudicial impact.”223 The court found no abuse of discretion and emphasized that a
witness’s willingness to lie to the government in an application for a license is highly probative of
his character for truthfulness.224 Moreover, the court noted that temporal considerations weighed
in favor of permitting the evidence since defendant’s answers were “not remote in time but, rather,
were roughly contemporaneous” with the criminal conduct charged.225 Finally, the central factual
issue at trial revolved around the defendant’s intent, making his credibility highly relevant to the
outcome of the case.226
After determining that the misconduct evidence could be a matter for cross-examination
under the requirements of FRE 608(b), the court then addressed the question of prejudice.227 The
court noted that revelation of prior arrests carried some potential for adverse effect, however,
ultimately concluded that the effect was not particularly inflammatory or of such detriment to
compel exclusion of the evidence.228 Also relevant to this determination, the court noted, was the

220

Id.
Id.
222
Id.
223
Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 16 (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes) (noting that the balancing
function is spelled out in FRE 403).
224
Id. at 17.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. (“We long have recognized that ‘all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must
be avoided.’” (quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir.1989))).
221

31

affirmative steps the trial court took to minimize any risk of unfair prejudice. 229 The trial court
did not permit the government to elicit any unnecessary or tawdry details regarding the arrests. 230
The trial court allowed the defendant to tell the jury about the ultimate disposition of the arrests
and about his belief that they had been expunged.231 Furthermore, the trial court offered to give a
limiting instruction.232
This case highlights the arguments in favor of the majority approach and illustrates all of
the factors properly taken into account by judges when determining whether cross-examination
into specific instances of conduct is appropriate. Further, the case demonstrates that this role given
to judges is not taken lightly and the rule requires in-depth balancing which serves to alleviate and
account for the possible dangers from the use of specific instances of conduct.
C. Counterarguments to the Use of the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s
Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct
While the federal rule was crafted with these dangers in mind, it is argued that the
limitations in FRE 608(b) and the other rules of evidence will not provide adequate safeguards
needed to prevent these dangers, and in some cases actually serve to create additional concerns.
As explained by Justice Albin in his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has “determined that ‘wide-ranging collateral attacks on the general credibility of a witness’
may lead to jury confusion and distract the jury from ‘the true issues in the case.’”233 Justice Albin
argued that these concerns are not diminished merely because extrinsic evidence cannot be
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introduced.234 Justice Albin also cautioned that the only limitation guarding the expansive use of
specific instances of conduct is Rule 403 which leaves all of the concerns and potential for danger
within the discretion of trial judges.235
First, regarding the limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence, it is recognized that the
exclusion of extrinsic evidence of specific conduct to impeach a witness’s character for
truthfulness does not completely eliminate the danger of confusion and prejudice from inquiry into
collateral matters “because the very question itself can convey the theoretically barred information
to the jury.”236 Merely asking a question about a specific instance of misconduct and leaving with
the jury only a bare denial from the witness can have prejudicial effects on the witness as well as
allow the jury to engage in speculation on an issue that is collateral to the merits of the case.237
Moreover, the phrase “taking his or her answer” can be misleading because it can be
understood as suggesting that the cross-examiner cannot continue pressing for an admission that
the past conduct did occur.238 FRE 608(b), however, authorizes this procedure.239 Thus, while
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counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer,” this merely means extrinsic evidence may not be
introduced.240

Counsel may proceed, however, with questioning and continue pressing for

admission, for instance, “by reminding the witness of the penalties for perjury.” 241 This creates
concern for undue harassment and still leaves open the threat of jury distraction and confusion
pertaining to issues collateral to the merits of the case.242
Second, apart from the limitation on extrinsic evidence, the only safeguard on the
expansive use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness is
Rule 403.243 The concern with Rule 403 is that while it does take into account the dangers that are
associated with cross-examination on specific instances of conduct, trial courts are given broad
discretion to make this determination.244 Thus, all of these concerns are left in the hands of one
judge and the determination cannot be overturned unless the reviewing court finds an abuse of
discretion.245 It has been argued that the task of regulating prejudice delegated by Rule 403
allocates broad power to trial judges to make individualized decisions about the relative
importance of competing principles, and as such is “inconsistent with the general hierarchical
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structure of our legal system.

Trial judges customarily exercise more limited, reviewable

discretion within a framework of standards set by higher authority.”246
Moreover, as Justice Albin noted, even in cases involving similar conduct, different judges
may come to different results when weighing the Rule 403 factors or when determining whether
conduct is probative of truthfulness.247 Thus, it is argued, the admissibility of potentially damaging
evidence is improperly left with the discretion of trial judges to be determined on a case-by-case
basis that is subject to change and ultimately does not adequately address the concerns that arise
when permitting inquiry into specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character.
V. New Jersey’s Options to Address the Issue and Make Changes to the Current Rule
While Justice Albin expressed valid concerns regarding the use of specific instances of
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness, a complete ban on any use of such
evidence presents equally troubling concerns. There are options to address the issues on both
sides. Allowing inquiry into past misconduct does have benefits. While it is recognized that it
can be difficult to point to past conduct and determine with any degree of certainty whether the
witness is telling the truth or lying, credibility is a critical issue in every case. 248 “Character
evidence, despite its flaws, may still serve a purpose in calling to the jury’s attention what might
be an otherwise unknown deficiency of the witness and thus give the jury a more adequate basis
for judging his testimony.”249
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Witnesses are often carefully prepped and coached by counsel to “project an in-court
character which suggests a high level of credibility.”250 Evidence that reveals the true character of
a witness can be used to “poke holes in this facade.”251 Moreover, witnesses may be inclined to
testify truthfully because a lie may open them up to an attack on their character in court.252 Further,
character evidence can act as a check on an attorney who may be tempted to offer testimony from
an unreliable witness because that witness’s lack of credibility could be revealed by opposing
counsel on cross-examination.253 Finally, admitting evidence regarding a witness’s character for
truthfulness can advance accurate fact-finding (a basic policy goal of the evidence rules), because
“just as a jury can be prejudiced against the plaintiff by the inclusion of some evidence, it can be
misled by the exclusion of other evidence.”254
In light of the costs and benefits of allowing specific instances of conduct to impeach a
witness’s character for truthfulness and taking into account the arguments posed by both sides, it
seems that New Jersey’s current formulation does not do enough to address all of the concerns.
The case that ignited this debate between the justices highlights the problems with New Jersey’s
current formulation. Where the prosecutor had a good-faith basis to ask the question, what is
wrong with asking a witness whether she had lied before to protect her son about a serious matter?
Such an inquiry bears directly on the witness’s character for truthfulness. As expressed by Chief
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Justice Rabner, however, New Jersey’s approach shields witnesses from this type of inquiry and
as a result impedes the search for truth and presents witnesses to the jury in an artificial light.255
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile why N.J.R.E. 608(b) allows evidence of a witness’s
prior false criminal accusations but inquiry into a witness’s statements made to exonerate a person
is prohibited.256 The New Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Guenther that its decision was not
made “on constitutional grounds, but rather by making a narrow exception to N.J.R.E. 608
consistent with the rationale of that rule.”257 Thus, the question remains as to what the logical
difference is between a prior false accusation and a false statement to exonerate that allows for the
disparate treatment under N.J.R.E. 608. In addition, the exception to N.J.R.E. 608 that resulted
from Guenther, now 608(b), allows “[t]he credibility of a witness in a criminal case [to] be attacked
by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation . . . .”258 This exception not only allows
inquiry into specific instances of conduct but goes beyond the federal rule and does not prohibit
the use of extrinsic evidence; rather it is left within the discretion of trial judge as to whether such
evidence should be admitted.259 Thus it is difficult to understand why FRE 608(b) is disfavored
when it provides a rule of limited admissibility, it protects against the dangers presented by specific
instances of conduct, and does not go as far as N.J.R.E. 608(b) by prohibiting extrinsic evidence.
The facts of State v. Scott provide a good example of how FRE 608(b) could be applied
and avoid any of the concerns regarding the use of specific instances of conduct. The State sought
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to introduce evidence of two prior occasions on which the witness, Barbella, allegedly lied to
police to exonerate her son, the defendant.260 Applying FRE 608(b), the trial judge would have
the discretion to admit the evidence. Whether such evidence could be permitted would be subject
to Rule 403 and any testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue
prejudice would not be permitted. The majority in Scott, and Chief Justice Rabner in his
concurring opinion, noted that there was a question concerning the prejudicial effect that could
result from asking about this prior conduct because it reveals that the defendant had previously
been in trouble with the police.261 The trial judge, however, could sanitize the evidence and only
allow the State to ask whether Barbella had lied to the police to exonerate others in the past. Thus,
by removing the fact that she had lied to exonerate her son, the prejudice that could result against
defendant is eliminated but the jury would still receive the information that relates to the witness’s
character for untruthfulness. In addition, if Barbella chose to deny that she had made those
statements, the prosecutor, under FRE 608(b), would have to take the witness’s answer and no
extrinsic evidence could come in to prove that Barbella engaged in the alleged conduct.
Given this illustration and the competing concerns regarding specific instances of conduct,
it would be beneficial for New Jersey to change N.J.R.E. 608(a) to align with the majority
approach. While the disadvantages outlined above do present valid concerns, New Jersey could
use the federal rule as a starting point and craft a rule that will take into account the arguments and
concerns expressed on both sides. The states have created different ways to handle the use of
specific instances of conduct with many taking a more restrictive approach. For example,
Tennessee’s rule, which follows a more restrictive approach, could be a framework for New Jersey
to follow.
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A. Tennessee Approach
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than convictions of crime as provided
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following conditions, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning the witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness or concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which the character witness
being cross-examined has testified.262
Both FRE 608(b) and Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) allow for the impeachment of a witness
by inquiring on cross-examination into specific instances of conduct that are probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness.263 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) also does not permit the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific instance of conduct had occurred. 264
Tennessee, however, has a number of added procedural safeguards that are designed to prevent
common types of abuse on cross-examination.265 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) has three
specific provisions that must be satisfied in order to use specific conduct evidence to attack a
witness’s character for truthfulness:
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence and must
determine that the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual
basis exists for the inquiry; (2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten
years before commencement of the action or prosecution, but evidence of a specific
instance of conduct not qualifying under this paragraph (2) is admissible if the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence and the court determines in the interests of justice that the probative
value of that evidence, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) If the witness to be impeached is the
accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must give the accused reasonable
written notice of the impeaching conduct before trial, and the court upon request
262
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must determine that the conduct’s probative value on credibility outweighs its
unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. The court may rule on the
admissibility of such proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior to the
testimony of the accused. If the court makes a final determination that such proof
is admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the
trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.266
Tennessee also added a further restriction concerning juvenile conduct which has no comparable
federal provision for such evidence.267 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(c) provides:
Evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness committed while the witness
was a juvenile is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however,
allow evidence of such conduct of a witness other than the accused in a criminal
case if the conduct would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the
court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination in
a civil action or criminal proceeding.268
Tennessee did not formally adopt the federal rule. In State v. Morgan,269 the Tennessee
Supreme Court incorporated FRE 608(b) into Tennessee case law.270 Thus, Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 608(b) reflects the Tennessee Supreme Court’s view of impeachment by specific
instances of conduct that attack a witness’s character for truthfulness.271 As a result the rule is
even more specific than the federal version.272
B. How New Jersey Can Incorporate Tennessee’s Rule to Address Justice Albin’s Concerns
New Jersey has the capability of drafting a restrictive rule similar to Tennessee in order to
fully address the concerns Justice Albin has expressed. Similar to Tennessee, New Jersey can
require a hearing to determine that a reasonable factual basis exists for cross-examining a witness
about specific instances of conduct and whether the alleged conduct has probative value in
assessing the credibility of the witness. In addition, in criminal cases, the rule could require
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counsel to give pretrial notice of intent to question a witness about misconduct, provide an
evidentiary basis, and show that the probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice. 273 This would
expressly incorporate the requirements under Rule 403 into the language of the rule, make notice
of the intent to use specific conduct evidence a requirement, and place a burden on the party
seeking to admit such evidence to present specific facts and circumstances.
Moreover, if still not satisfied by Rule 403, New Jersey could adopt an altered balancing
test for courts to employ in making the determination regarding prejudice. Minnesota, for
example, in criminal cases, requires the court to employ a balancing test that “is not the Rule 403
test favoring admissibility unless probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by unfair
prejudice.”274 Rather, the rule incorporated the balancing test used by the court in State v. Fallin,275
and under this test, “the court should not allow the cross-examination if probative value and unfair
prejudice are closely balanced.”276 The evidence should not be allowed unless the prosecutor
establishes that the probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs the potential for unfair
prejudice.277 Thus, this rule would err on the side of exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the
evidence is a closer call.
New Jersey can adopt a time limit that declares certain actions after a specified number of
years presumptively barred. New Jersey could take this a step further and set a shorter time limit
than the ten-year limit in Tennessee’s rule and add any further burdens on the party seeking to
present such evidence. New Jersey could also add further restrictions as deemed necessary like
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Tennessee did by adding subsection (c) to its rule to address specific concerns in particular
contexts. Further, New Jersey could adopt restrictions and standards to help guide judges when
making the determination to allow cross-examination into specific instances of conduct. With
regard to what conduct is probative of truthfulness, New Jersey can elect to take the narrow view
which provides that conduct is admissible only if it directly involves falsehood or deception.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Guenther explained that New Jersey bars
“the use of prior instances of conduct to attack the credibility of a witness for two essential reasons:
to prevent unfairness to the witness and to avoid confusion of the issues before the jury.”278 These
goals, however, can be met by carefully crafting a rule that would address such concerns and at
the same time provide for the use of specific instances of conduct in cases, like the case at issue
here, where such instances bear directly on a witness’s veracity. As Justice Albin explained when
writing for the court in State v. Guenther, when “the ‘auxiliary policies’ underlying the rule do not
apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence no longer exists.”279 As shown by FRE
608(b) and the majority of states that have adopted similar rules, it is possible to adopt a rule that
will address the auxiliary polices and under such a rule, the rationale for total exclusion of specific
instances of conduct would no longer exist.
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